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THIRD PARTIES AND THE THIRD SEX: CHILD
CUSTODY AND LESBIAN LEGAL THEORY
Ruthann Robson*
The third party doctrine in child custody rests upon an assumption
that a child has two parents-one of each gender-no more and no
less.' Thus, the third party doctrine results from a mandate of heterosexuality in the form of a male-female dyad, relegating all others to the
less preferenced position of "third" party. This specific legal doctrine is
not unlike the sexology theory which likewise mandates heterosexuality
in the form of a male-female dyad, rendering all those who do not
couple in male-female formations as members of a "third" sex. Not
only are the sexology third sex theory and the legal third party doctrine
linked by their heterosexist assumptions, but both of these notions of
"third" have little relevance to contemporary lesbian existence. This
Article argues that just as contemporary discourse has abandoned the
third sex theory as an explanation of lesbian relations, legal theory must
reject the third party doctrine as a method of regulating lesbian relations inclusive of children. Further, this Article argues that as a matter
of lesbian legal theory,2 because of the third party doctrine's fundamentally flawed origin in a male-female dyad, as well as its continued
perpetuation of that heterosexual dyad, it must be discarded.
After brief discussions of the unrelated theories of the "third sex"
and third party doctrine, this Article will examine the third party
doctrine in the context of lesbian relations with children.3 This exami-

* Professor of Law. City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law. TIM author

wishes to express her appreciation to S.F. Valentine and Joyce McConnell for their continued
support, to the other participants in the Symposium for their insights and inspiration, and especially to the editors and staff of the Connecticut Law Review for their organizational efforts.
their editorial suggestions, and their patience.
1. Legal scholar Karen Czapanskiy describes this as the "Adam and Eve" maodl of parenthood.
2. Lesbian legal theory puts lesbians and lesbian survival at its theoretical center rather than
law. See generally RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF
LAw (1992) [hereinafter ROBSON, (OUT)LAw].
3. The focus of this Article is thus narrow. For works which consider lesbian relations with
children which are not focused solely on the effects of third party doctrine, see ROBSON.
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nation will specifically consider three categories of third parties: the

lesbian nonlegal mother,4 including her legalization as a second parent;
the sperm donor; and the grandparents or other biological relatives. An
examination of the cases reveals that the third party doctrine can
operate both to the advantage and disadvantage of lesbians. While this
inconsistency might be explained by the inconsistent positions lesbians

occupy, all such inconsistencies are grounded in the inapplicability of
the heterosexual dyad which underlies third party doctrine.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE NOTION OF THE THIRD SEX

The "body and soul of a woman, the spirit and strength of a man,"

"a third sex which has not yet got a name," is the fictional self-description of the narrator of the 1835 French novel Mademoiselle de Maupin

by Theophile Gautier.' The sort of men who might guard Oriental harems, those members of the "third sex," is the uncomplimentary description of feminist reformers in the 1886 Congressional Record.6 Despite
its influence on literary, social, and legal conceptions, however, the
term "third sex" originates in neither discipline. Instead, the term "third
sex," with its companion concept of "sexual inversion," is a product of
nineteenth-century science, specifically medicine and the developing
disciplines of psychiatry and psychology! As encapsulated by lesbian

historian Lillian Faderman:

(OUT)LAW, supra note 2, at 129-34; Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting:
Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1009 (1989), Felicia Meyers. Comment.
Gay Custody and Adoption: An Unequal Application of the Law, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 839
(1993); Steve Sosoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or
Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REv. 852 (1985). See also Katherine Amup, Mothers Just Like Others: Lesbians, Divorce and Child Custody in Canada, 3 CAN.
J. WOMEN & L. 18 (1989); Margaret Bateman, Lesbians, Gays and Child Custody: An Australian Legal History, I AUSTRALIAN GAY & LESBIAN L.J. 47 (1992); Frank Bates, Child Custody
and the Homosexual Parent: Some Further Developments in Australia and the United States. 2
AUSTL. GAY & LESBIAN LJ. 1 (1992).

4. For a discussion of the choice of the term "nonlegal" rather than the more common term
"nonbiological," see infra note 54.
5. Cited in DAVID F. GREENBURG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 406 (1988).
6. 71 CONG. REC. 2,786 (1886) (statement of Sen. Ingalls).
7. See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GULS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF
LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 35-61 (1991) [hereinafter FADERMAN, ODD
GIRLS]; LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE
BETwEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 239-53 (1981) [hereinafter

FADERMAN, SURPASSING]; GREENBURG, supra note 5, at 397-433; George Chauncey, Jr., From
Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the Changing Conceptualization of Female
Deviance, 58-9 SALMAGUNDI 114 (1982-83).
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A lesbian, by the sexologists' definition, was one who rejected
what had long been the woman's role. She found that role
distasteful because she was not really a woman - she was a
member of the third sex .... All her emotions were inverted,
turned upside down: Instead of being passive, she was active,

instead of loving domesticity, she sought success in the world
outside, instead of making men prime in her life, she made first

herself and then other women prime. She loved womankind
more than mankind.
The definition of the female members of the third sex began in
1869 when the German psychiatrist Carl von Westphal published the
first study of female "sexual inversion." 9 His disciples included the

British psychiatrist Havelock Ellis, author of the influential text Studies
in the Psychology of Sex, 0 and Richard von Krafft-Ebing, author of
Psychopathia Sexualis." Such physicians and their American counter-

parts, collectively known as sexologists, 2 sought to apply scientific
methodology and rigor to the study of sex. Concentrating on sexual
variance and pathologies, their investigations included the subject of
homosexuality, which they conceptualized in medical-psychological

terms. Under the medical model, homosexuality is reconceptualized as a
medical condition, rather than a crime or a sin. 3 While the
sexologists' attempt to remove homosexuality from the realms of law
and religion could be interpreted as a liberalization, 4 the

8. FADERM N, SURPASSING, supra note 7. at 240.
9. Karl Friedrich & Otto Westphal. Die Contralre Sexualempfindung: S)7nptom eines
neuropathischen (psycopathischen) Zustandes. 2 Archiv fur Psychiatric und Nervenkranklbiten
73-108 (1869), cited in FADERM AN, ODD GIRLS. supra note 7. at 316.
10. HAVELOCK EITs, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX: SEXUAL INVERSION (reprint
1911) (1897).
11. RICHARD VON KRAFFr-EBING, PSYCHPATHIA SEXUALIS: A MEDICo-FORENSIC STUDY (Harry Wedeck trans., 1965) (1886).
12. For a general history of the American sexologists. see JANICE M. IRVINE. DISORDERS OF
DEstum: SEX AND GEuDER IN MODERN AmCAN SEXOLOGY (1990).
13. However. the theorizing of the sexologists occurred within a religious and legal contexL
For example, in Havelock Ellis' chapter on sexual inversion in women in STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX, supra note 10, he justifies his conclusion that homosexuality is "not less
common in women than in men,' with reference to a "Catholic confessor, a friend tells me.
informed him that for one man who acknowledges homosexual practices there are three women." Id at 195. He also notes that "a remarkably large proportion of the cases in which homosexuality has led to crimes of violence, or otherwise come under medicolegal observation, has
been among women." specifically detailing two American murder cases. Id. at 200-02.
14. As George Chauncey notes. Havelock Ellis considered that his theories, specifically the
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medicalization of homosexuality operated less as an ultimate liberaliza-

tion than as a shift in the modes of regulation.

5

Further, it did not

6
completely supplant either religious or legal regulation.'
The sexologists' deployment of the notions of third sex and sexual

inversion rests upon a strict antipodal relation between gender identity
and gender "object-choice," as well as the assumption of a heterosexual

hegemony. The sexologists posited that if one was sexually attracted to
women, one must be a man or a "man" inhabiting what might appear
to be a woman's body. This "appearance" of being a bodily woman
merited further interrogation by the sexologists, who concluded that the
female members of the third sex did not appear entirely feminine, but
evinced masculine traits. The articulation of these masculine traits was
extremely racialized or ethnicized, as well as being class-coded. For
example, Havelock Ellis used body-hair and musculature as indicators
of female sexual inversion. 7 Further, as lesbian historian Lillian

congenital basis of homosexuality, had "politically progressive implications, since it might remove homosexual behavior from the purview of the law." Chauncey, supra note 7, at 136.
While not disputing the congenital model, the Nazis nevertheless implicitly interpreted
sexology as a permissive force, thus engaging in a sustained persecution of sexology and the
sexologists, often linked with anti-homosexual and anti-Semitic terrorism. See Erwin J. Haeberle.
Swastika, Pink Triangle, and Yellow Star: The Destruction of Sexology and the Persecution of
Homosexuals in Nazi Germany. in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESIAN
PAST 365 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter HIDDEN FROM HISTORY].
15. In his ground-breaking study and collection of documents relating to gay and lesbian
lives, historian Jonathan Katz devotes a substantial section to the treatment of lesbians and gay
men by psychiatric-psychology professionals. JONATHAN KATz, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 129-207 (1976). As he notes, among the treatments are
"surgical measures: castration, hysterectomy, and vasectomy. In the 1880's. surgical removal of
the ovaries and clitoris are discussed as a 'cure' for various forms of female 'erotomania,' including, it seems, Lesbianism. Lobotomy was performed as late as 1951." Id. at 129. Katz also
notes that varieties of drug therapies have also been used, including hormones, LSD, sexual
stimulants and sexual depressants, as well as shock treatments and aversion therapy. Id.
For an excellent first-person contemporary account, see MARTIN DOBERMAN, CURES (1991).
16. Perhaps the most notorious American example of the continuing religious and legal regulation of sexuality, and their interdependence, is contained in Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
17. Ellis concludes that "there seems little doubt that inverted women frequently tend to
show minor anomalies of the pilferous system, and especially slight hypertrichosis and a masculine distribution of hair." ELLIS, supra note 10, at 253. He then describes a "very typical case
of inversion in an Italian girl of 19" with "down on the arms and legs" and "very abundant
hair in the armpits and on the pubes." Id. Ellis further notes that "a woman physician in the
United States who knows many female inverts similarly tells me that she has observed the tendency to growth of hair on the legs." Id. at 254. Ellis connects his observations regarding body
hair to sexual inversion by supposing that both are controlled by an "abnormal balance in the
internal secretions," id., although he does admit that his observations may be complicated by
ethnic varieties in the distribution of body hair, if not .cultural variances in its removal. Con-
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Faderman notes, the sexologists' case studies of female inversion were
derived from "a captive population in prisons and insane asylums,
daughters of the poor," and did not exhibit an understanding that poor
servant women "might have more difficulty surviving" if they were
more feminine-acting." Perhaps even more problematic is the fact that
not only is the identification of masculine traits racialized, ethnicized,
and class-coded as it relates to notions of masculine/feminine polarized
sex characteristics, but the very identification of sexual expression is
similarly culturally determined. In a regime that regulated female sexuality in accordance with race, ethnic and class status,' 9 any expression
of sexual interest was pathologized. In addition to a reliance upon culturally determined and perceived traits to assess masculinity, the
sexologists emphasized the masculine invert while failing to adequately
account for her only possible partner within their heterosexualized theory: a nonmasculine woman.2
While the sexologists' definition of female members of the third sex
stressed the twinned scientific subjects of biology and psychology, it

ceming muscle tone, Ellis does not speculate that such a diversity might be attributable to
physical exertion, including work. Id. at 255.
Of course, not all of Ellis' masculine attributes are coded. For example, "inverted women
are very often good whistlers," although Ellis cautions that mere "whistling in a woman is no
evidence of any general or physical or psychic inversion." Id. at 256.
18. FADEmAN. ODD GIRLS, supra note 7, at 41.

19. As Estelle Freedman and John D'Emilio argue in their excellent history of American
sexuality:
In nineteenth century thought, sexual control helped differentiate the middle class
from the working class, and whites from other races ....
For the middle class, an
elaborate ideal of femininity emphasized and stressed sexual purity as a means of
controlling male excess and stressed women's domestic and maternal roles. Women
who did not achieve the ideal of purity were considered to have "falleo" into a lower
class. If poor, they might even be arrested for committing such "crimes against chastity" as "lewd and lascivious behavior."
J. D'EMiuo & Esraaa FREEDMAN, INTATE MATrERS: A HISTORY 0F SEXUALITY IN AmtRtCA 57 (1988).
20. As George Chauncey notes, "most of the early accounts of sexual inversion discussed
only the invert, leaving her sexual partner anonymous and undefined .... Many accounts simply treated [these sexual partners] as normal wives, playing their proper feminine roles, as if it
did not matter that their 'husbands' were biologically female." Chauncey, supra note 7, at 125.
Although Chauncey notes that subsequent sexologists began to take more interest in the socalled "passive homosexual woman." itL at 128-29. there is a continuing argument that the nonmasculine lesbian remains essentially untheorized--and perhaps untheorizable--in the medical
model of homosexuality which is based upon a heterosexual matrix. See. e.g.. Esther Newton.
The Mythic Mannish Lesbian: Radclbffe Hall and the New Woman, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY.
supra note 14, at 281, 292 (referring to the nonmasculinized lesbian lover, Mary, in Radclyffe
Hall's famous lesbian novel, and stating that "Mary's real story has yet to be told.").
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was not without its political implications. Thus, although the sexologists
labeled a woman who had a sexual relationship with another woman as
a "congenital invert," a "victim of inborn 'contrary sexual feeling,"'
possessing a condition attributable to "tainted heredity," passed on by
parents "who themselves lacked the appropriate 'strong sex
characteristics," ' '2' such characteristics could be linked with the political movement of feminism. For some sexologists who subscribed to a

biological explanation of lesbianism, this connection was carefully negotiated.' For others, feminism as a political ideology itself became theorized as almost an "organic" defect.' For seemingly everyone, including Freud24 and United States senators, 25 lesbianism and feminism became linked as pathologies. Although this linkage might not be solely

responsible for the failure of "first-wave" feminism, 26 it was certainly
21. FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS, supra note 7, at 40.
22. For example, Havelock Ellis noted that although the women's movement of emancipation
is on the whole "wholesome and inevitable," it has "certain disadvantages" when applied to the
sexual sphere. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 262. He further stated that the influences of "modem
movements cannot directly cause sexual inversion." they can "develop the germs of it, and probably cause a spurious imitation." Id.
As Carol Smith-Rosenberg observes,
The connections Ellis drew between what he believed was a rising incidence of middle-class lesbianism and feminist political and educational advances reveal a man
troubled by changes he could not in principle oppose. Feminism, lesbianism, equality
for women, all emerge in Ellis's writings as problematic phenomenon. All were unnatural, related in disturbing and unclear ways to increased female criminality, insanity, and "hereditary neurosis."
Carol Smith-Rosenberg, Discourses of Sexuality and Subjectivity: The New Woman, 1870-1936,
in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY, supra note 14, at 264, 271.
23. Chauncey persuasively supports his conclusion of "the organic relationship between the
women's movement and inversion" with this passage from an article published in 1900:
The female possessed of masculine ideas of independence; the viragint who would sit
in the public highway and lift up her pseudo-virile voice, proclaiming her sole right
to decide questions of war or religion, or the value of celibacy and the curse of
women's impurity, and that disgusting anti-social being, the female sexual pervert, are
simply different degrees of the same class-degenerates.
Chauncey, supra note 7, at 141 (quoting William Lee Howard, Effeminate Men and Masculine
Women, 71 N.Y. MED. J. 686, 687 (1900)).
24. In his diagnosis in a "case of homosexuality in a woman," Freud disagrees with the notion of a third sex, instead concluding that there is a "continual mingling and blending . . . of
inherited and acquired factors" which undergirds the importance of Freud's finding that his
young female patient was "in fact a feminist." 2 SIGMUND FREUD, The Psychogenesis of a Case
of Homosexuality in a Woman (1920), in COLLECTED PAPERS 202, 228-29 (1959). Of course,
this patient also exhibited a strong attachment to her mother and an envy of her brother's penis,
id. at 228-30, although Freud's earlier work describes such characteristics as universally female.
See SIGMUND FREUD, Femininity, in NEv INTRODUCTORY LECTURES 112 (1965).
25. See supra note 6.
26. Cf. CELIA KITZINGER, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LESBIANISM 42 (1987) (arguing
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one strategy of anti-feminist rhetoric in the early 1900s."
While we no longer conceptualize lesbians as members of the "third
sex," the importance of the sexologists' conception of the "third sex"
cannot be underestimated. It certainly influenced the entire field of

psychology,' as well as lesbian literary production, ' and it continues
to influence our contemporary notions of lesbian and gay identities and

their corresponding legal implications.3 Further, the sexologists' rather
that the "effect of the new science of sexology was to scare women back into marriage and
conformity" and stating that "one reason historians have cited for the demise of the frst wave
of feminism was the success of the sexologists' diagnosis of feminists as suffering from the
newly invented disease entity of lesbianism.")
27. This strategy was also exhibited during "second-wave" feminism of the late 1960's and
1970's and is still practiced today. See Radicalesbians, The Woman Identified Woman. in RADICAL Fthmtsst 240, 241 (Anne Koedt et al. eds., 1973) ("lesbian is the word. the label the
condition that holds women in line"); Anne Koedt, Lesbianism and Feminism. in RADiCAL FE?,tiNIsM 246, 246-48 (Anne Koedt et al. eds., 1973) (discussing "lesbian baiting").
28. Psychoanalysis is linked with sexology and sexual theory, and Freud's work is undoubtedly indebted to the work of many sexologists. As the scholar Jeffrey Weeks notes. in Freud's
influential Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality., published in 1905. Freud acknowledges the
contributions of sexologists Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis. as well as other sexologists.
JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTMENTS: MEANINGS. MYTHtS AND MODERN SEXU-

ALTEs 67-68 (1985).
29. The most obvious example is Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness (1928). the rust
edition of which contained an introduction by none other than the famous sexologist Havelock
Ellis, banned in Great Britain for its explicit defense of lesbianism, and considered to be the
foremost lesbian novel for several decades. See JEANErM FOsTE,

SEX VARIAh'r WO.IEN IN

LrrmEtJru 279-80 (1985) (1st ed. 1956) (describing the publication of The Well, its reception.
as well as a plot synopsis and critical evaluation); BoNIE Z, IERMAN, THE SAFE SEA OF
WoMEN: LESoaN FicTIoN 1969-1980. at 7 (1990) ("for over forty years. The Well of Loneliness and Stephen Gordon [the main character] virtually defined lesbianism"): Newton. supra note
20, at 282 (discussing the implications of the fact that "The Well, at least until 1970. wvas the
lesbian novel").
30. However, I do not agree with the principle that the medical model created or invented
homosexuality or homosexual, gay or lesbian identity.
The influential French philosopher and intellectual Michel Foucault is often considered the
originator of the conclusion that nineteenth century medical (and legal) discourses "invented" the
homosexual:
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth century psychiatry, jurisprudence and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of
homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and "psychic hermaphrodism" made possible a
strong advance of social controls into this area of "perversity": but it also made
possible the formation of a "reverse" discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its
own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or "naturality" be acknowledged. often in
the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualifled.
MICHEL FOUCAULT,

I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INMODUcIoN

101 (Robert Hurley

trans., 1978). The Foucauldian formulation linking homosexual identity and the nineteenth century sexologists has become the dominant view. See. e.g., VAYN'E R. DYNES. Gay. in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALTrrY 455-56 (1990) (explaining that the use of the term "gay" in
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Instead, it

was a fundamental preservation of a well-established heterosexual hegemony that continues to demand the integrity of two separate and distinct genders. This demand is necessary so that sex-and perhaps the
entire natural world-can be conceptualized with reference to the norm
of heterosexuality.32 Thus, although we no longer employ the term
"third sex" to describe lesbian (or gay men's) relations, we continue to
deploy its underlying premise of paradigmatic heterosexuality.

reference to homosexual men did not originate until the late nineteenth century); WEEKS, supra
note 28, Anne Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching For the Hid-

den Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick. 97 YALE L.i. 1073, 1088 (1988) ("No attitude toward
'homosexuals' or 'homosexuality' can really be identified before the mid-ninetccnth century
because the concept did not exist until then."); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531, 537 (1992) ("The word 'homosexual' and idea that the homosexual was
a different kind of person were developed by late-nineteenth-century sexologists proposing
medicalized causation theories for sexual behavior.") (citing JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OUTI'
HOMOSEXUAL POLrrICS IN BRrrAIN 23-32 (1977)); Robert Mison. Homophobia in Manslaughter:
The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation. 80 CAL L. REV. 133. 148 (1992) (citing

JOHN BOSwELL. CHRISTIANrIY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOsEXUALrY (1980)).
Instead, I would argue for a much more nuanced interpretation. While certain historical
coincidences do seem apparent, I am more persuaded by the argument of George Chauncey that:
it would be wrong to assume. I think, that doctors created and defined the identities
of "inverts" and "homosexuals" at the turn of the century, that people uncritically
internalized the new medical models, or even that homosexuality emerged as a fully
defined category in the medical discourse itself in the 1870's. Such assumptions attribute inordinate power to ideology as an autonomous social force; they oversimplify
the complex dialectic between social conditions, ideology, and consciousness which
produced gay [and lesbian] identities, and they belie the evidence of preexisting subcultures and identities contained in the literature itself.
Chauncey, supra note 7. at 115. Thus, I reject the "invention" conceptualization because it denies the validity of pre-existing lesbian identities and communities as well as denying lesbian
agency.
Nevertheless, it certainly cannot be argued that the medical model is irrelevant. Its continuing relevance to current conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality is persuasively argued in Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 82 CAL. L. REV.

(forthcoming Dec. 1994) (manuscript on file with author).
31. Accord WEEKS, supra note 28, at 73 ("Sexology did not appear spontaneously at the end
of the nineteenth century. It was constructed upon a host of pre-existing writings and social
endeavors.").
32. As theorist Michael Warner writes, heterosexual culture conceptualizes itself as the elemental form of human association, the model of gender relations, and the means of reproduction. Warner illustrates his point with reference to a drawing placed on NASA's Pioneer 10
spacecraft designed to convey human society: a drawing of a man and a woman, immediately
recognizable as "a heterosexual couple" testifying to the depth of cultural insistence that "humanity and heterosexuality are synonymous." Michael Warner. Introduction to FEAR OF A
QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLMCs AND SociAL THEORY at vii. xxii-xxiii (Michael Warner ed.,

1993).
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THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE

Third party doctrine in the realm of child custody is likewise a
tortured doctrine which seeks to preserve the heterosexual matrix and

the notion of two separate and distinct genders. At its most fundamental, third party doctrine posits that each child has one mother and one
father-no more and no less. Outside of the two parties necessary to
complete the heterosexual matrix, others occupy the less-privileged legal

position of third parties. Like the sexologists' theoretical stance, this legal doctrine is predicated upon current notions of biology.33 Also, like
the sexologists' notions of the third sex, third party doctrine is often
convoluted and disparate.

The general rule-that third parties are in a less-privileged position
with regard to claims of children as compared with parents-is derived

from "natural" law' which has found expression in constitutional principles. Parenting is thus deemed a "fundamental right" in as much as it
is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The origins of
parental rights as fundamental rights are generally traced to Meyer3'
and Pierce,3 6 two cases which reached the U.S. Supreme Court during
the 1920s, and which involve conflicts between parents and state regu-

lations regarding the education of children.37 In Meyer, the Court expounded upon the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause as including:

the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to

33. Of course, the entire biological foundations of parenthood are presently contested. The
legal consequences of such contests have provoked much commentary. See. e.g., Lori Andrews
& Lisa Douglas, Alternative Reproduction. 65 S. CAL. L REv. 623 (1991); Janet Dolgin. Just a
Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood.40 UCLA L REV. 637 (1993).
34. While natural law is often impliedly invoked, common law doctrines which are products
of particular patriarchal cultures are also relevant. For example, the notion that a biological
parent has a claim on a child is arguably based upon the notion of children as property, often
legally expressed as the notion of family unity or autonomy. Family unity ideology proclaimed
the husband/father as head of the household and all other members subject to his economic and
physical control.
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36. Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
37. Meyer involved a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of any modem language
other than English at any public or private grammar school. Pierce involved an Oregon statute
mandating attendance at public schools, which did not include any private schools not operated
by the State.
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marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.38
The Court in Pierce relied upon Meyer to posit "the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control," stating with a rhetorical flourish that the "child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny

have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations. '39 Importantly, as in Meyer, the Court
in Pierce did not rely solely upon parental rights; in Pierce, the Court
also credited the liberty interests of the private institutions which would
be deprived of property should the state statute mandating education at
public institutions be deemed valid.'
Despite the problematic precedential pedigree of Meyer and
Pierce-as they treat freedoms of liberty and contract in a manner consistent with the approach that was prevalent in the discredited Lochner
era4 t-and
after remaining relatively dormant for several decades,
Meyer and Pierce have been resuscitated in contemporary privacy doc-

trine. In familial-and later individual-privacy doctrine, the fundamental parental right becomes not only the right to make choices relating to

the performance of one's parental role, but also the right to make
choices relating to whether or not one will assume a parental role.42

38. 262 U.S. at 399.
39. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
40. Id. at 535-36.
41. The Lochner era is generally dated from Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)
until Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). during which time the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated approximately two hundred state statutes attempting to regulate economic relations.
The era takes its name from its most notorious case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), in which the Court declared unconstitutional a state statute limiting work hours in bakeries to sixty hours per week and ten hours per day because it interfered with "liberty of contract" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to one
scholar, Lochner is "one of the most condemned cases in United States history and has been
used to symbolize judicial dereliction and abuse." BERNARD H. SIEGAN, EcONOMIc LIBERTIgs
AND THE CONSTtMYrON 23 (1980). Other commentators agree. See generally C. Edwin Baker,
Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986);
Robert McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, in 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 3462 (Philip Kurland ed., 1962); Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(1987).
42. This choice is an individual right to make the decision, but importantly, it is also a right
of access to information about the decision. Thus. in Griswold. involving arrests for providing
"information, instruction and medical advice" concerning the use of contraception. Justice Doug-

19941

CHILD CUSTODY AND LESBIAN LEGAL THEORY

1387

This development results in the continuing line of contraception and
abortion cases which give various effect to the freedom to decide
whether or not one will become a parent. As most recently expressed
by the Court, these "most intimate and personal choices a person may
make... are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 43

Related to contemporary privacy doctrine, as inclusive of contraceptive and abortion decisions affecting whether or not an individual will
assume a parental role, are cases in which the parental right involves
the state's termination or nonrecognition of an individual's parental
status. In the termination context, the recognition of a fundamental
parental right serves as a constitutional regulation of state procedures in
which the state is seeking to terminate an individual's parental status.
For example, in Lassiter, although the Court recognized a fundamental
parental right, the right seemed to suffer in comparison to the more
tangible liberty interest implicated by imprisonment; thus, the Court did
not hold that appointment of counsel was constitutionally mandated in a
termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.'" A year later in Santosky,
the Court recognized that a fundamental parental right is especially vital
during termination proceedings and thus declared that due process required a showing of a relatively high standard of proof-clear and convincing evidence--before parental rights could be extinguished4 In
the context of the recognition of parental status, the problem centers on
identifying individuals who merit a fundamental parental right rather
than on an interpretation of the specific contours of any fundamental
right. Such cases-which can be collectively referred to as the "unwed
father" cases4--result from contemporary challenges to traditional ide-

las relied upon the educational-rather than the parenting---aspects of Meyer and Pierce to declare that the state may not "contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 482 (1965).
43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791. 2807 (1992).

44. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Writing for a bare majority
of the Court, Stewart accorded some weight to the state's
contention that termination proceedings are not as complicated as criminal proceedings, but also noted that termination proceedings
could contain confusing expert evidence. He therefore reasoned that trial court discretion should
generally govern the appointment of counsel.
45. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Like Lassiter. Santosiy was decided by a bare

majority of the Court, only this time the Court's opinion was written by Justice Blackmun.
author of the compelling dissent in Lassiter.
46. See. e.g.. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott. 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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ology which bestows parenting status according to a gendered disparity:
women are deemed parents through the biological "fact" of giving birth,
while men are deemed parents through the legal "fact" of a formal
relationship such as marriage with the woman who gave birth.47 Despite erratic recognition of fundamental parental rights for unwed biological fathers, the uneven application of such rights in the context of
parental termination proceedings, and the volatile predicament of contraceptive and abortion rights, the notion of a fundamental parental right
grounded in the liberty guarantee of the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments remains firmly entrenched in constitutional doctrine.
The constitutional principle recognizing a fundamental parental right
is indisputably not a solitary principle, but is situated within the complexities of a constitutional context in which the child is also accorded
a measure of legal recognition. First, within a due process analysis, the
parent's fundamental right is subject to infringement by the state if such
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The state's assertion of the best interest of the child is considered a
compelling state interest; the state's interest and the child's interest become coextensive because the state relies upon its role as parens patriae in the assertion of the child's welfare.4" Second, within any constitutional analysis, there is the possibility of conflicting individual
constitutional rights. So it is possible that the parent's constitutional
rights would conflict with the child's constitutional rights, necessitating
a balancing of rights. However, this approach has been relatively rare,
perhaps because the state is invested with parens patriae status to assert
the child's rights or possibly because the lesser status of minors' constitutional rights insure that any parental fundamental right would dominate. 49

47. This view is articulated by Justice Stewart dissenting in Caban, 441 U.S. at 394. and
subsequently approvingly affirmed by the Court in Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 n.25.

48. Justice Blackmun makes this clear in Saniosky, 455 U.S. at 766, although in Santosky
the Court is not applying the compelling state interest test but the less stringent test of

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring the balancing of three distinct factors
including the private interests affected by the proceeding, the risk of error created by the state's
chosen procedure, and the countervailing governmental interest supporting the use of the procedure).
49. This is certainly the situation in the constitutional adjudication of state statutes which require parental consent to obtain an abortion. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Asheroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Compare In re T.W.. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 (Fla.
1989) (holding that under the Florida Constitution's explicit privacy provision, minors' constitu-
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Against this backdrop of constitutional principles, individual states
have taken different approaches to recognizing the existence of any
fundamental parental rights in the custody and control of children by
privileging parents over nonparental third parties. One commentator
divides the state approaches into three distinct clusters: the parental
rights standard, the parental presumption standards (including various
types of presumptions), and the best interest standard.50 The vast majority of states explicitly accord some privileged position to parents in
comparison to nonparents in custody determinations. Although the expression of this privilege differs, typically the privileging requires the
establishment of some reason to depart from the general rule that parents are entitled to custody of their children. For example, in New
York this principle is articulated as a requirement that "exceptional
circumstances" are necessary for a court to create an exception to the

recognition of rights afforded to both parent and child in their relationship.5 ' Nonrecognition of a parental privilege, perhaps best expressed

as a "pure" best interest standard-in which courts "focus solely on the
best interest of the child" without giving any preference to the child's
legal parents --isa relatively rare minority position. Nevertheless, the

tional rights are not properly balanced against the relaxed "significant" state interest of fedral
constitutional law, but can only be overcome by a "compelling" state interest similar to adults).
50. See Suzette M. Haynie, Comment, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to
Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?. 20 GA. L REv. 705 (1986).
51. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
52. Haynie, supra note 50, at 721. Although the student commentator reported that "ten
states currently apply a best interests standard to third-party custody disputes." and listed six
jurisdictions as explicitly doing so. id., the number is now significantly less. For example. the
commentator included Connecticut as one of the six jurisdictions which have clearly adopted the
best interest standard, id. at 721 n.58 (citing McGaffin v. Roberts. 193 Conn. 393. 479 A.2d
176 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985)). However, the Connecticut courts have subsequently rejected McGaffm in light of the Connecticut statute, enacted in 1985 and amended in
1986, which explicitly provides that "in any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the
child to be in the custody of the parent." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-56(b) (1985). See also
Perez v. Perez. 212 Conn. 63. 561 A.2d 907 (1989). Similarly, the commentator cited Hawaii
Revised Statutes section 571-46(2) (1976) which provides that "custody may be awarded to
persons other than the father or mother whenever such award serves the best interest of the
child:' While this certainly lends itself to an interpretation that it explicitly adopts a pure best
interest test which would not include a parental preference and at the time of the comment no
cases had construed the statute, subsequent Hawaii decisions have interpreted subsection 46(1) of
the statute to unequivocally provide that child custody, including best interests, mandate "priority
to the child's parents." In re John Doe. 786 P.2d 519. 523 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990); In re Jane
Doe, 784 P.2d 873, 879 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989). And in yet another jurisdiction included as
explicitly adopting the best interest test. the Supreme Court of North Dakota subsequently stated
that in cases in which
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rhetoric of best interests of the child can also privilege natural or legal
parents. The best interest of the child standard accomplishes this privileging through the general rule that it is within the best interests of any
child to be within the custody of her or his natural or legal parents.
The best interest standard's privileging of parents usually contains a
caveat allowing for proof that the general rule might not be true in any
particular instance.
Third party custody doctrine has thus developed into a rather arcane
and convoluted set of preferences, presumptions, rhetoric, and caveats.
Commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the doctrine, employing examples such as unwed fathers, step-parents, foster parents, grandparents, and "surrogate mothers" to illustrate the incoherency of the
doctrine in a society in which the doctrine's underlying premise of the
nuclear family is no longer accurate.5 3 For lesbians and our relationships with children, the underlyink premise of third party custody has
never been accurate, and its application is ill-equipped to serve our
interests.
III.

THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE AND LESBIAN RELATIONS WITH
CHILDREN

The doctrine of third party custody is deemed applicable to three
categories of lesbian relationships with children. The first category is
embodied by the lesbian nonlegal mother and occurs in the context of
her efforts to obtain custody or visitation in the case of a rupture of
her relationship with the legal mother, as well as in the context of her
efforts to adopt the child of the legal mother. In this category, the
notion of "third party" can operate to bar the lesbian nonlegal mother
from being recognized as a legal parent to her child. The second category of third parties includes putative fathers, especially sperm donors.
These third parties are often extraneous to the lesbian legal mother, her
partner who shares parenting as the lesbian nonlegal mother, as well as
to the child. Nevertheless, largely due to their biological status, these
third parties may be deemed not to be third parties, and thus may be
erroneously privileged as parents. The third and final category consists
a psychological parent and a natural parent each seek a court ordered award of custody, the natural parent's paramount right to custody must prevail unless the court
determines that it is necessity in the best interests of the child to award custody to
the psychological parent to prevent serious detriment to the welfare of the child.
Patzer v. Glaser. 396 N.W.2d 740, 743 (N.D. 1986).
53. See Comment, Third Party Custody and Visitation: How Many Ways Should We Slice the
Pie? I DET. C.L. REv. 162 (1989).
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of grandparents and other relatives of the child. Usually motivated by
disapproval of the legal mother's lesbianism, these third party relatives
assert a right to custody and often prevail, despite their less-privileged

status. Thus, taken in its entirety, third party doctrine does not simply
disadvantage or advantage lesbian mothers. This inconsistency might be

explained by the various positions lesbian mothers occupy, but it is also
explainable by recognizing the underlying male-female dyad as a basis
for third party doctrine. The inapplicability of the very notion of third

parties is demonstrated by a further examination of cases within each of
the three categories.
A.

The Lesbian Nonlegal Mother
The lesbian nonlegal mother, usually the lover or former lover of a

child's legal mother,'M challenges the heterosexual matrix of third party

54. I use the terms nonlegal and legal rather than the more common terms nonbiological and
biological for two reasons. First, many lesbian mothers become legal mothers through adoption
rather than biological birth. Second. and more importantly, the issue for lesbian legal theory is
exactly the legal identity of lesbians as determined and enforced through law. Although the term
"nonlegal:' as well as "legal" may seem to foreclose the very issue to be decided, itshould be
recognized that both terms are contingent as well as being based upon interpretation rather than
"fact" As feminist scholar Isabel Marcus notes in another context:
Legal identity is a personification in law of values and roles attributable to individuals, groups, or organizations by courts or legislatures. The express purpose for this
acknowledgement is connected with formal access to the legal system. The legal
identity of parties determines whether they have standing in a legal contest.
In fact. legal identity is a social construct-a set of categories reflecting a socially constructed reality. It is premised upon a multitude of cultural choices regarding
accepting societal arrangements, including a determination regarding the competence of
persons or entities to operate in a civil society. It is underpinned by a set of cultural
beliefs regarding the autonomy of persons in a category and a social assessment of
their capacity to make meaningful choices. This competence or capacity is identified
with the ability to recognize and to assume responsibility for morally differentiable
acts, including those acts subject to legal sanctions . . ..
Legal identities developed and used for the recognition of classes of human
beings tend to rely on such socially constructed categories as age. race. mental ability, sex, and marital status. To the extent that these socially constructed categories are
visible or ascertainable with relatively minimal effort, they are treated as self-evident
or natural. This apparent self-evidentness reinforces the sense of the cultural appropriateness of the category and the boundaries embodied in the category. And so. the
fact that each of these categories is socially constructed and reinforces existing power
relations is easy to ignore. At best, a particular argument about a hard case involving
the margin of a socially constructed category may be left for the judge or scholar.
Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform in
New York State. 37 BuFF. L. REv. 375, 386-89 (1988-89) (footnotes omitted).
Of course, the term "lesbian" itself is a category, and this category is often enforced
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custody by being the "other" mother in an ideology that acknowledges
only one mother, the third party in an ideology that admits of only two
parents, one of each gender. While there have always been lesbians
who have shared their lives with children,55 within the last two decades lesbians have explicitly challenged the hegemony of the only-one-

mother ideology in law," as well as in other forms of lesbian writings,57 including literature.58 Whether the challenge of the nonlegal

mother is fundamental or superficial is, of course, debatable, 9 as is

through legal mechanisms. See, e.g., Nita Iyer, Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the
Shaping of Social Identity, 19 QUEEN'S L.J. 179 (1993); Ruthann Robson, Incendiary Catego.
ties: Lesbians/Violence/Law, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4-9 (1993); Ruthann Robson, The Specter of a Lesbian Supreme Court Justice: Problems of Identity in Lesbian Legal Theorizing, 5
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 433 (1993).
55. See, e.g., ELLEN LEWIN, LESBIAN MOTHERS: ACCOUNTS OF GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1993) (noting anthropological and sociological study of American lesbian mothers began
in 1977); DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LESBIAN/WOMAN 131-63 (1972Y (chapter entitled
"Lesbians are Mothers Too"); Audre Lorde, Turning the Beat Around: Lesbian Parenting 1986,
in A BURST OF LIGHT 39 (1988) (discussing parenting by lesbians of color); Matile Rothschild,
Life as Improvisation, in LESBIANS AT MIDLtFE: THE CREATIVE TRANSITION 91 (1991) (noting
"there had always been lesbian mothers," but not until the early 1970s did they begin to organize); see also POLITICS OF THE HEART: A LESBIAN PARENTING ANTHOLOGY (Sandra Pollack &
Jeanne Vaughn eds., 1987) [hereinafter POLITICS OF THE HEART]; WE ARE EVERYWHERE: WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT LESBIAN PARENTS (Harriet Alpert ed., 1988).
56. The important published legal works include Paula Ettlebrick, Who Is A Parent?: The
Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513 (1993);
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459
(1990); Carmel B. Sella, When a Mother is a Legal Stranger to her Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 135 (1991).
Much legal work also occurs through litigation, lobbying, education, and support by organizations such as the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, many local defense committees, ad-hoc committees, advocacy groups, and countless
individual legal workers and lesbians.
57. For a general work attempting to reconceptualize lesbian parenting as well as other lesbian and gay "kinship" relations, see KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS,
KINSHIP (1991).
Several selections in POLITICS OF THE HEART, supra note 55, address this issue, including
Jan Clausen, To Live Outside the Law You Must be Honest: A Flommy Looks at Parenting, at
333; Pamela Gray, The Other Mother: A Lesbian Comother's Journal, at 133; Pat Parker, Gay
Parenting, Or, Look Out Anita, at 94; Sandra Pollack, Two Moms, Two Kids: An Interview, at
120; Nancy Zook & Rachel Hallenback, Lesbian Coparenting: Creating Connections, at 89.
58. Fictional accounts include JAN CLAUSEN, SINKING STEALING (1985) (novel about legal
mother's death and lesbian nonlegal mother's subsequent relation with child); RUTHANN ROBSON,
CECILE (1991) (interrelated stories about the daily struggles of two lesbians and their child).
Poetic accounts include selections from POLITIcs OF THE HEART, supra note 55: Mab
Segrest, Annie's First Poem. at 132; Martha Shelley, The Diatribe of the Deserted Poet, at 146.
59. As Carmen Sella notes, "[lI]esbian motherhood is at once radical and reactionary. It is
radical in the sense that lesbian couples are now empowered to create families in the absence
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the nature of the challenges posed by any lesbian "family" formation. °

Litigation involving sundered lesbian relationships in which the
nonlegal mother is seeking custody or visitation-and importantly, the

legal mother is denying such custody or visitation-enforces the notion
of a heterosexual dyad to exclude the lesbian nonlegal mother. In these

cases, the other mother is a third party non-parent. Despite a plethora
of theories which have been advanced in support of the nonlegal
mother's parental status,6 scholarly critique of judicial denial of parental status to the nonlegal mother,6- and legal scholarship which persuasively argues for expanded conceptions of parental status,63 the general rule is that the nonlegal mother is a third party, whatever her current or past relationship with the child.
Perhaps the most famous of these cases is Alison D., 6 decided by
New York's highest court.' The factual background of Alison D. illus-

trates the typical scenario at issue in these cases: one member of a
lesbian couple gave birth to a child through alternative insemination.6

of a male figure.. . . Yet, lesbian motherhood is reactionary in that lesbian couples are now
replicating heterosexual norms and fulfilling women's traditional function as mothers."
Sella, supra note 56, at 140.
60. For discussions of family as a relevant category for lesbians. see Didi Herman. Are We
Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation, 28 OSGOODE HALL U. 789 (1990); Ruthann
Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians in Feminist Legal Theory. 19 SIGNS: A
JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND CULTURE (forthcoming 1994). See also Susan Boyd. (Re)Placing the
State: Family, Law & Oppression, 9 CAN. J. L & SOC. I (forthcoming 1994) (arguing the
interrelatedness of state and family in the oppression of heterosexual women, lesbians, and gay
men); Shelley Gavigan, Paradise Lost, ParadiseRevisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology
for Feminist, Lesbian and Gay Engagement to Law, 32 OSGOOD HALt L. (forthcoming 1994)
(manuscript on file with author) (discussing the interlocking nature of various identities in legal
enforcement of family ideology).
61. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Ettlebrick. supra note 56; Polikoff. supra note 56; Sella. supra note 56.
63. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood. 98 YALE L. 293 (1988)
(suggesting a redirection of the law toward parental status based upon "responsibility and connection"); Janet Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assanptions About Parenthood. 40 UCLA L
REv. 637 (1993) (examining and critiquing the underlying biological assumptions in unwed
father and surrogate mother cases); John Lawrence Hill. What Does It ,lean To Be A "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights. 66 N.Y.U. L REV. 353 (1991)
(arguing for "intention" to replace biology as determinative of parental status).
64. Alison D. v. Virginia M.. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
65. For extended discussions of Alison D., see Ettlebrick. supra note 56. and Kimbedy Carr.
Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests of the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK. L REv. 1021 (1992).
66. Although the term "artificial" insemination is widely used in the legal literature the term
"alternative" insemination is preferred by many lesbians who have been involved in the process.
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After the adult couple's relationship dissolved, the legal mother eventually refused to allow her former lover to visit with the child. In the
Alison D. litigation, the New York courts uniformly held that the lesbian nonlegal mother was not within the definition of parent and therefore had no standing to bring a petition for visitation against the child's
biological mother. 67 The high court rejected the petitioner's claim of
"de facto parenthood" as insufficient to overcome the legal definition of
parent.68 Only the sole dissenting judge, the highly regarded feminist
jurist Judith Kaye, gave credence to an empirical approach; in the first
paragraph of her opinion she refers to estimates that "more than 15.5
million children do not live with two biological parents, and that as
many as 8 to 10 million children are born into families with a gay or
lesbian parent." 69
A few months later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided In re
ZJH (Sporleder v. Hermes)." In ZJH, the two women lived together
as lovers for approximately eight years. As the court described, "after
an unsuccessful attempt to have a child through the artificial insemination of Sporleder, they decided that Hermes would adopt a child." '
One month after the couple separated, Hermes' formal adoption was
completed and she prohibited her former lover Sporleder from visiting
the child. The court upheld previous pronouncements that Sporleder had
no standing to bring an action for either visitation or custody. The
court first reasoned that Sporleder did not fit into any of the statutory
categories allowing third parties to bring actions for visitation or custody, including circumstances in which "neither parent is fit and proper to
have custody of the child" or in which "compelling circumstances"--defined by precedent as similar unfitness on the part of the parent
such as "abandonment, persistent neglect of parental duties, or extended
disruption of parental custody" 7 2 -were present. The court then reasoned that Sporleder was not within the statutory category of "parent,"
including any theory of in loco parentis.' ' 3 As a nonparent, Sporleder
was without standing to bring an action for custody, and was similarly
without standing to bring an action for visitation.74 Dissenting, Justice
67. In an unreported opinion, the trial court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division
affirmed. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
68. 572 N.E.2d at 29.
69. Id. at 30.
70. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
71. Id. at 204.
72. Id. at 205-06.
73. Id. at 206-09.
74. Id. at 204. As the court noted, under the Wisconsin statute the ability to bring an action
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Shirley Abrahamson stressed the need for a hearing to examine the
contract between the adults and the best interests of the child? 5
A court of appeals in Minnesota reached a similar result, although
based upon a more liberal statute applied to more complicated facts. In
Kulla v. McNulty,76 a referee had found that Kulla established a prima
facie case under the Minnesota third party custody statute, but a court
concluded otherwise and dismissed Kulla's petition for visitation with
the child, K.R.M. The child had been born to McNulty while she was
in a lesbian relationship with Kulla, who became the child's caregiver,
at least while McNulty was "away from home working as an airline
attendant." McNulty, however, subsequently resumed a relationship
with the child's biological father and later married him. She specifically
disavowed any implication that her relationship with Kulla was serious:
"McNulty contends that she entered into the relationship [with Kulla]
initially out of curiosity as to the gay lifestyle, and although she was
fond of appellant [Kulla], McNulty asserts that the extent of her feelings were that she found appellant merely amusing and enjoyable for a
time." ' Applying the three prongs of the Minnesota third party visitation statute, which required the court to find that visitation be in the
best interests of the child; that the petitioner and the child had established emotional parent-child ties; and that the visitation would not
interfere with the custodial relationship between the parent and the
child,79 the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the third factor was not satisfied. Responding to Kulla's
argument that satisfaction of the third factor was practicably impossible
and could be effectively prevented by a biological parent's non-cooperation, the court noted that, absent the statute, Kulla would have absolutely no right to petition for visitation.
Of the reported cases considering a nonlegal mother's right to petition for visitation, only A.C. v. C.B.,8' decided by a New Mexico appellate court, does not per se exclude the nonbiological mother as a

for custody is conferred on a broader basis than the ability to bring an action for visitation.

Id

at 210.
75. Id at 213-14 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The other dissenting justice relied solely on
the principle that the best interest of the child demands accommodations to a child's rights in a
nontraditional relationship. Id at 214-15 (Bablitch. J.. dissenting).

76.
77.
78.
79.

472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 177.
Id at 178.
MmNN. STAT. § 257.022(2b) (Supp, 1989).

80. 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. CL App. 1992), cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N11. 1992).

1396

CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1377

nonparental third party. Reversing the trial court, the appellate
court-like Justice Shirley Abrahamson dissenting in Z.J.H."-stressed
the fact of the parties' coparenting and custody agreement, but also
noted that the nonbiological mother had made a "colorable claim of
standing to seek enforcement of such claimed rights" of visitation.82
From these cases, several theories of parenthood emerge as arguments to circumvent the harsh consequences of third party doctrine,
especially in the absence of a statute. Almost all of these theories were
explicitly considered by the California appellate court in Nancy S. v.
Michelle G." Again, the factual details are excruciatingly typical. Nancy S. and Michelle G. lived together since 1969; Nancy S. gave birth
to one child conceived through artificial insemination in 1980, and to a
second child conceived through the same method in 1984. Both children had birth certificates which named Michelle G. as "father" and
were given Michelle G.'s "family name." Both children also referred to
both Michelle G. and Nancy S. as "Mom." When Michelle G. and
Nancy S. separated in 1985, they agreed to a joint-custody arrangement
which was successful for three years. After disagreements, Nancy S.
instituted an action to declare Michelle G. as "not a parent of either
child." 84
In arguing that she was a parent, Michelle G. relied upon the theories of de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, equitable estoppel, and the
functional definition of parenthood. All of these theories supported the
position that Michelle G. should be deemed a parent, thereby forestalling the operation of third party doctrine which would place her in a position of considerably less entitlement than Nancy S.
The court considered and rejected the merit of each of these theories, although it did not necessarily disagree with their factual relevance.
For example, the court found that Michelle G. might factually be entitled to the "the status of a 'de facto' parent," but that de facto parental
status was not equal to legal parental status.8" Specifically, the court
considered the de facto parent as a third party, and applied its third
party doctrine to conclude that "custody can be awarded to the de facto
parent only if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that

81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
82. 829 P.2d at 665. The court also noted that sexual orientation alone is not determinative.

Id. at 664.
83. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 214.
85. Id. at 216.
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parental custody is detrimental to the child." Similarly, the court decided that the concept of in loco parentis, even if it was factually relevant, was irrelevant in the context of custody decisions. Further, the
court declined the invitation to declare Michelle G. a parent by equitable estoppel in accordance with her argument that the legal mother,
Nancy S., should be equitably estopped from denying Michelle G.'s
parental status because of Nancy S.'s prolonged encouragement and
support of the parental relationship. The court rejected this argument by
noting that equitable estoppel had never been applied in California
"'against a natural parent" and that its application in other states had
rested upon important considerations not present in this case. Specifically, the court noted that the doctrine had been applied to prevent a wife
from denying paternity of her husband. The court reasoned that this use
was rooted in one of the strongest presumptions in law: that a child
born to a married woman is the legitimate child of the marriage.' The
court then declared that "no similar presumption" applied to this
case.88 The court's failure to analogize the lesbian relationship illustrates this Article's argument that the third party doctrine, even in its
exceptions, results from the mandate of heterosexuality in the form of a
male-female dyad. The logic of the court thus relegates the "third sex"
relationship to "third party" status. Finally, the court considered the last
theory proffered by Michelle G. and rejected any legal parental status
derivative of functional parental definitions,89 ostensibly because the
acceptance of functional parenthood would be impracticable. 0
In addition to family law doctrines of parenthood, the specter of
constitutional privacy of the parental relationship haunts Nancy S. as
well as the other cases involving lesbian nonlegal parents.' Privacy
considerations serve to constitutionalize third party doctrine by concep-

86. Id
87. Id. at 218 (citing Brenda J. Runner. Protecting A Husband's Parental Rights When His
Wife Disputes The Presumption of Legitimacy. 28 J. FAmi. LAW 115 (1989-90)).

88. Id.
89. The court relied upon Polikoff. supra note 56. for its formulation of functional parenthood as including "anyone who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a

legally recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental
in nature." 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (quoting Polikoff, supra note 56. at 464).
90. The court stated that adopting the functional parenthood relationship would necessitate

"years of unraveling the complex practical, social, and constitutional ramifications of this expansion of the definition of parent." Id. at 219.
91. Although the court in Nancy S. does not explicitly refer to constitutional doctrine the
court notes that the "critical importance in California of the right to parent has bzen affirmed
and reaffirmed." Id. at 217.
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tualizing it as state protection of the parent-child relationship from third
party interference. In this construction, constitutional recognition of a
parental fundamental right does not operate as a bulwark against state
intrusion into parental rights, but as a preservation of parental rights
against persons with non-cognizable legal claims. As one court observed, to the extent a decision grants rights to the nonbiological parent,
it "diminish[es] the rights of legal parents."
Given the prevalent application of third party doctrine to deny
lesbian nonbiological or nonlegal parents visitation or custody, one
solution would be to change the status of the nonlegal mother to that of
a legal parent so that she would no longer be a third party. Explicated,
outlined, and advocated as a necessary reform in the legal literature
before its appearance in the courtroom, 93 so-called "second-parent"
adoptions are gaining some judicial acceptance. In allowing these adoptions, courts have struggled with the strict heterosexuality of parenting
ideology which does not contemplate lesbian parents. This heterosexual
ideology is often implicitly articulated in the statutory requirements for
adoption. For example, in the first reported second-parent adoption case,
In re Adoption of T. & M,94 the District of Columbia court had to
construe the District of Columbia's code section which provided that a
final decree of adoption terminated the relationship between the child
and his or her natural parents except in the case in which one of the
natural parents is the "spouse of the adoptor." 9 Through the use of
the term "spouse" as the only exception to terminating parental rights,
the code section reinscribes (heterosexual) marriage as well as the notion of heterosexual parenting. In struggling with this issue, the District
of Columbia court declined to read the statute literally; instead, it read
the termination provision as directory rather than mandatory,
analogizing the situation to a spousal, step-parent adoption, and stressing the best interest of the child. 96 Similarly, New York trial courts,

92. In re ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Wis. 1991).
93. See, e.g., Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier is
in a Child's Best Interests, 3 BERKELEY WoMEN's LJ. 96 (1987-88); Elizabeth Zuckerman.
Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of the
Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 729 (1986).
94. 1991 WL 219598 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 30. 1991). In re Adoption of T. & M. considered dual petitions for adoption: one lesbian adopted her lover's biological child conceived
through artificial insemination, while the other lesbian adopted her lover's previously adopted
child.
95. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (1989).
96. 1991 WL 219598, at *2-*3. The court stated:
[Alt bottom adoption cases are decided by the application of the best interests of the
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first in Evan,97 and later in Caidin and Emily, 8 a New Jersey trial
court in J.M.G., 9 and the supreme courts of Vermont and Massachusetts in B.LV.B. & E.LV.B.'00 and Tammy,'Y" all construed the applicable statutes as not requiring the termination of the legal parental
relationship, relying on the step-parent analogy and the best interests

standard.'0 2 While the favorable results in these cases are far from
uniform,0t

3

it does portend a practical solution in some cases'o' to

the problems caused by third party doctrine, which relegates nonlegal
parents to disfavored status in custody proceedings. The interwoven
nature of the relation between third party doctrine and second-parent

adoptions has not gone unnoticed by the courts.1' s
Nevertheless, although this intertwined relation has practical benefits, at a more theoretical level, the solution of second-parent adoptions

child standard, and whenever possible other conflicting considerations give way to that
standard if there is a conflict.
Here the court concludes that the "cut-of' language need not be read in such a
way as to thwart the best interests of these children. This is so because neither of
the original legislative purposes underlying the provision has application to this specific factual situation.
I at *3.
97. In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Sur. CL 1992).
98. In re Adoption of Caitlin & Emily, 1994 WVL 149728 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. Jan. 6. 1994).
99. In re Adoption of J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (NJ. Super. CL 1993).
100. In re Adoption of B.LV.B. & E.L.V.B.. 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
101. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). For a brief discussion. see Recent
Case, 107 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1994).
102. Despite variances in the statutes and opinions, the cases are remarkably similar. The most
distinguishable case is Tammy, in which the lesbian partners filed a joint petition for adoption
under the Massachusetts statute. 619 N.E.2d 315. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
allowed the adoption of Tammy by both petitioners: Susan (Tammy's biological mother) and
Helen (Tammy's nonlegal mother). Id.at 321.
103. For example, in In re Dana, N.Y. LJ. (Putnam Cry. Faro. Ci. Jan. 26. 1994). in which

the court stated that although there was no question that the adoption was in the best interest
of the child, "that issue can only be reached once the legal predicate is established. i.e_ that
the party has a legal basis in law to be an adoptive parent." Id.The court concluded that the
New York legislature's clear intent was "to deny a single person the right to adopt another's
child while the natural parent, a single person, retains parental rights." lIdThe court opined that
it was the role of the legislature to change the law, while also noting that "Ibly this decision.
the Appellate Courts of this state will have the opportunity to decide whether that avenue is the
one:' li
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Vermont's decision in B.LV.B. & E.LV.B. reversed a
trial court's denial of an adoption. 628 A.2d at 1271.
104. For example, a second-parent adoption would not have been a solution in Kulla v.
McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). in which the lesbian legal mother later married the child's biological father.
105. The court in Nancy S. specifically mentions adoption as a method to prevent the "tragic
situation." 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 & n.7 (Cal. Ce. App. 1991).
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to the problem of third party doctrine poses at least two problems.
First, taken together, third party doctrine and second-parent adoptions

not only mutually reinforce each other but structurally sustain the dyadic nature of parenthood. Although the successful second-parent adoption
cases certainly advance an emancipatory agenda for lesbians by not

perpetuating sexual orientation discrimination, t 6 lesbians must nevertheless carve themselves out as exceptions to the heterosexual mandate
while remaining analogous to step-parents.'0 7 This challenge requires
lesbians to satisfy the most traditional and stereotypical terms of the
heterosexual marriage mandate: the relationship between the two lesbians must be long-term, committed, and monogamous.' 08 Further, there
must be a maximum of two lesbians: there can be a second parent, but
a third lesbian cannot be a third parent; she must be a third party. It is
difficult to imagine a court bestowing even its limited generosity to a

106. The trial judges in Evan and J.M.G. are most affirmative in their antidiscrimination rationale. As the judge stated in Evan. the "fact that petitioners maintain an openly lesbian relationship is not a reason to deny adoption," supporting his conclusion with a lengthy footnote considering the social science, psychological and legal literature. 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001 & n.l
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). The judge thereafter considered the law of New York that "a child's best
interest is not predicated or controlled by parental sexual orientation," and the adoption statute's
explicit rejection of homosexuality as excluding prospective parents. Id. at 1001-02. Similarly,
the judge in J.M.G. expansively stated that New Jersey law "has recognized that the rights of
parents cannot be denied, limited or abridged on the basis of sexual orientation." 632 A.2d 550.
553 (NJ. Super, Ct. 1993).
107. The New Jersey trial court expressed the compelling quality of the analogy first taking
note of a precedent which did not foreclose the possibility that stepparent could apply to a
person who lived with but was not married to the legal parent, 632 A.2d at 553 & n.3, and
then concluded that it:
feels constrained by the state of the law from proclaiming J.M.G. an actual "stepparent," given the fact that same-sex marriages are not legal in this state. However, I
am convinced that in this adoption, J.M.G. should be treated as a stepparent as a
matter of common sense, and in order to protect the child's interests in maintaining
her relationship with her biological mother.
Id. at 553.
108. The opinions invariably include in the recitation of relevant facts-often as the first sentence-a satisfaction of this implicit criteria: "The petitioners, Diane F. and Valerie C. have
lived together in a committed, long term relationship, which they perceive as permanent, for the
past fourteen years." Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998; "[In both adoptions], the couples have lived
together in committed, long term relationships for nine and twelve years respectively. Each couple viewed its relationship as permanent, akin to marriage." Caitlin & Emily, 1994 WL 149728,
at *I; "The plaintiff and E.O.. the biological mother, have been in a committed relationship for
approximately 10 years." J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 551: "Appellants are two women, Jane and
Deborah. who have lived together in a committed, monogamous relationship since 1986." In re
Adoption of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993); "Helen and Susan have
lived together in a committed relationship, which they consider to be permanent, for more than
ten years." Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993).
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configuration of three or more lesbian parents. Thus, because of its
insistence on a dyad, second-parent adoption suffers from many of the
same ideological shortcomings as same-sex marriage."0 9
Second, the second-parent adoption cases reinforce a dominate social structure based upon economic stratification. Just as the sexology
theory-and its consequences-differed markedly for women of the
higher and lower classes,"' so too does the requirement that the dyad
be heterosexual seem to relax with economic privilege. Typically, immediately after noting the dyadic nature of the relationship evidenced
by its longevity and mutual commitment,"' the court recounts the indicators of the lesbians' elevated class status, including professional occupations and home ownership."' In Tammy, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts explicitly includes a resultant economic benefit,

109. For discussions of problems with same-sex marriage. see Nita Duclos. Some Complicating
Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, I LAw & SEXUALITY 31 (1991); Mary Dunlap. The Lesbian
and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties. I LAW &
SEXUALITY 63 (1991); Nan Hunter. Marriage, Law & Gender: A Feminist Inquiry. I LAW &
SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Nancy D. Polikoff. We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage."
79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine. Loijh)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partnersand Lesbian Legal Theory. 63 TFMtP. L. REV. 511 (1990).
110. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 108.
112. For example. immediately following the court's recitations concerning the dyadic nature
of the relationship, see supra note 108, the respective courts declare: "Diane, age 39. is an
Assistant Professor of Pediatrics and an attending physician at a respected teaching hospital.
Valerie. age 40. holds a Ph.D. in developmental psychology and teaches at a highly regarded
private school." Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998: "Plaintiff is employed part-time by a cable T.V.
network and is the primary caretaker of the child. E.O. is an executive vice-president for a
large communications company. They jointly own a home and other properties for investment
purposes. They have a low six-figure combined income." J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 551; "In June.
1983, they jointly purchased a house in Cambridge. Both women are physicians specializing in
surgery .... Both women also held positions on the faculty of Harvard Medical School."
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 316.
In Caitlin & Emily. the New York family court judge first describes the circumstances
relating to the conception of the children and its appointment of law guardians, bWfore it provides the indicators of class status of the two lesbian couples. The first couple. one of whom is
an environmental engineer, live with the children in "a large two-story 100-year-old house in
excellent repair, in a quiet neighborhood on a tree-lined street." 1994 WL 149728, at *I.The
second couple are relatively less advantaged, although certainly not disadvantaged, one member
of the couple being employed at a "large local corporation." and the couple living with the
children "in a nearby suburb in a neat and well-furnished raised ranch." Ild.
Only the Supreme
Court of Vermont's opinion. B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, does not contain indicators of
economic status. While the absence of economic facts may be attributable to the trial court's
rejection of the adoptions on legal grounds causing the record to be devoid of factual fimdings,
id.at 1276, this opinion, as well as Caitlin & Emily, demonstrates that economic evidence can
be irrelevant or minimized.
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in the form of trust funds to which the child will become entitled, as

part of its best interests of the child determination." 3 Thus, because
of its emphasis on economic privilege, second-parent adoption again
suffers from many of the same ideological shortcomings as same-sex
marriage." 4
The lesbian nonlegal mother, usually the lover or former lover of a

child's k-gal mother, whether adoptive or biological, has the potential to
challenge the heterosexual dyadic model of parenting. However, when

she is deemed a third party, her challenge is unsuccessful because third
party custody doctrine relegates her to an irrelevant or disadvantaged
position. On the other hand, when she is accorded status as a second

parent, her challenge is diluted because second-parent adoption doctrine
assimilates her to the dyadic model of parenting. While in practical
terms, the otherwise nonlegal mother may prefer second parent status t1 5 to third party exclusion, especially in the event of a dissolution
of the parenting dyad, lesbian legal theory must confront the ideological

structures which produce this "practical" result. Politically and ethically,
it is problematic that the practical protections are often necessary because one member of the former dyad is enforcing her desires through
legal formalism." 6 Theoretically, it is significant that the practical so-

113. As the court stated:
Susan indicated that the adoption is important for Tammy in terms of potential inheritance from Helen. Helen and her living issue are beneficiaries of three irrevocable
family trusts. Unless Tammy is adopted, Helen's share of the trusts may pass to
others. Although Susan and Helen have established a substantial trust fund for
Tammy, it is comparatively small in relation to Tammy's potential inheritance under
Helen's family trusts.
619 N.E.2d at 317. In considering the best interests of the child determination required for
adoption, the court referred to the practical consequences of the adoption which "will entitle
Tammy to inherit from Helen's family trusts and from Helen and her family." Id. at 320.
114. For example, although there are particular economic benefits of marital status, these economic benefits accrue only to certain classes of people. For other, less privileged classes, marital
status or its imputation can be a marked disadvantage, as in the public benefits context. See
generally supra notes 22-23.
115. This preference is based upon the continuation of the lesbian's desire to continue to
parent the child and of both lesbians' desire to co-parent the child, as well as upon the child's
desire to have the lesbians as parents.
116. As I have stated elsewhere, I believe lesbian legal theory must confront the issue of the
construction of the dispute between the lesbian mothers in legal terms because this results in a
domestication of lesbian lives and theories. See ROBSON. (OuT)LAW, supra note 2, at 139-41.
Further, as stated by lesbian legal activist and theorist Paula Ettlebrick, the lesbian community
has developed an "ethic that says that a lesbian biological mother may not rely on the patriarchal definitions of parenthood to defeat her partner's rightful claims to visitation or custody."
Letters to the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of
Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), June 1993. at 1 (letter of Paula Ettlebrick).
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lution ultimately reinforces the dyadic structure of parenting which is
responsible for the problem requiring a solution.
B.

The Sperm Donor

In all of the so-called second-parent adoption cases, the sperm
donor or biological father as the potential second-party to the parent
dyad is either implicitly or explicitly relegated to impossibility. When
the sperm donor or biological father is not so relegated, but instead
sues for visitation or custody, he threatens to assume the status of a
member of the parental dyad rather than a third party, even if the child
has a lesbian dyad in the parenting role. As in the sexologists' theorizing of a "third sex," the sperm donor cases are tortured attempts to
honor the interlocking and inconsistent analytics of biology and heterosexuality, as well as the preservation of male hegemony.
Biology threatens to become determinative of social realities when
"sperm donor" and "father" become synonymous terms. While biological paternity is not always legal paternity under constitutional doctrine," 7 statutes regulating artificial insemination usually exclude the

donor from paternity only when the recipient is a "married woman,"
and the insemination is performed by a licensed physician."" Thus,
biological paternity achieves its greatest social stature when it is necessary to establish the heterosexual parenting dyad: if there is another
male to occupy the male-member of the dyad, then the donor is irrelevant. However, if there is not such a male, then the donor is necessary

117. See supra notes 46-47.
118. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act § 5(b) applies to married women when the

artificial insemination is performed by a licensed physician. For a list of states adopting the
Act, see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT. 9B U.L.A. 287 (1990). However, mor recently. two other related uniform laws have been proposed which change the emphasis on marriage, although these
have not been as widely adopted. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHMLDEN OF ASSISTED Co.NCEpIn
Acr, 9B U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994); UNIF. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS Acr. 9B UJ..A.
53 (Supp. 1994).
For scholarly treatments of the "unmarried" woman's constitutional rights with reference to
alternative insemination, including her right to obtain it despite licensed ph)sicians' disinclination

to inseminate unmarried women, see Carole A. Donovan. The Uniform Parentage Act and
Nonmarital Motherhood-by-Choice, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 193 (1982-83): Patricia
A. Kern & Kathleen 1A. Ridolfi. The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right
to be a Single Parent Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WOI1EN's RTS. L REP. 251
(1982); Karen A. Morrisey, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Practical and Legal Issues Involved in Single Motherhood, 1 Wis. WOMEN's LJ. 97 (1985); see also Denise S. Kaiser. Note.
Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients. 26 J. FAm.
L. 793 (1987-88).
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to complete the dyad. For example, in a visitation proceeding brought
by the sperm donor C.M. against the legal mother C.C.," 9 the court
declared C.M. the natural father and awarded him visitation, reasoning
that:
In this case there is a known man who is the donor. There
is no husband. If the couple had been married and the
husband's sperm used artificially, he would be considered the
father. If a woman conceives a child by intercourse, the "donor"
who is not married to the mother is no less a father than the
man who is married to the mother. Likewise, if an unmarried
woman conceives a child through artificial insemination from
semen from a known man, that man cannot be considered to be
less a father because he is not married to the woman.
...There was no one else who was in a position to take
upon himself the responsibilities of fatherhood when the child
was conceived ....
It is in20 a child's best interests to have two
possible.
whenever
parents
'While such an outcome is not inevitable,' 2' it can be the same even
when the consideration of the donor as one-half of the parental dyad
potentially excludes the lesbian nonlegal parent. For example, in one of
the first known lesbian parenting cases, Jhordan H. v. Mary C., 22 the
court awarded the sperm donor visitation over the objections of Mary,
the legal mother, and Victoria, a "close friend who lived in a nearby
town." Victoria had participated in the selection of Jhordan as the
sperm donor; agreed "to raise the child jointly" with the legal mother;
participated in the pregnancy; and assisted in the birth.' 23 The court
applied both the marital-status limitation and the physician requirement
of the artificial insemination statutes to declare inapplicable any of the

119. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977). C.C. is apparently not a
lesbian. As described by the court, C.M. testified that he and C.C. had been "seeing each other
for some time and were contemplating marriage. She wanted a child and wanted him to be the
father, but did not want to have intercourse with him before their marriage." Id. at 821.
120. Id. at 824-25.
121. For example, in McIntyre v. Couch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 495

U.S. 905 (1990), the court rejected the sperm donor's argument that the state statute should not
apply because the statutory requirements of physician intercession and marital status were unsatisfied. The court construed the physician and marital language as not mandatory, remanding the
case for determination of the existence of any agreement that the sperm donor assume parental
status.

122. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
123. Id. at 532.
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protections from donor interference.' 24 Further, the court specifically
rejected the contention by Mary and Victoria that, with the child, they

"compose a family unit" which should be accorded family autonomy-"

In addition to statutory interpretation, the court based its con-

clusion that any family formation must include the sperm donor on a
record which "demonstrates no clear understanding that Jhordan's role

would be limited to provision of semen and that he would have no
parental relationship with [the child]."' 6 Facts deemed relevant by the
court included the legal mother's failure to object to Jhordan's monthly

visits after the birth and his pre-birth collection of baby equipment and
establishment of a trust fund. t27
The question of the quality and quantity of "facts" necessary to

transform the biological paternity of the sperm donor into the person of
a legal father, as well as issues of legal interpretation, are presented in
Thomas S. v. Robin Y." Rendered by a New York trial court in
1993 and presently on appeal, this case has attmcted much legal and commu-

nity attention and dissension."

In Thomas S., the child in question

was born in 1981 into a household comprised of two lesbian parents

124. The court justified its deference to the physician requirement of the Uniform Parentage
Act as enacted by the California state legislature with reference to the health reasons and the
need for the presence of a "professional third party such as a physician" to "create a formal.
documented structure for the donor-recipient relationship." Id. at 534-35. The court rejected the
legal mother's argument that the marital distinction in another statute not explicitly requiring a
physician in cases of the artificial insemination of married women violated her constitutional
right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because a married woman and an unmarried woman are not similarly situated for equal
protection purposes because the "marital relationship invokes a long-recognized social policy of
preserving the integrity of the marriage." Id. at 536.
125. Id. It is perhaps unusual, especially given the relatively early occupance of this case, that
the court did recognize Victoria's position as a psychological parent, although it declined to declare her a "de facto parent," and it recognized her right to visitation, IAtat 537. Importantly.
however, this situation would certainly have been different if Mary C., as legal. biological, and
custodial parent, had attempted to exclude Victoria, as in the California case of Nancy S. V
Michelle G., three years later. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
126. 224 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
127. Id.
128. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993).
129. Perhaps the best illustration of this attention and dissension are the letters written in
response to the description of the case (entitled "Judge Denies Parental Status to Gay Sperm
Donor") published in the May 1993 issue of LESBLANIGAY LAW NOF-s. Although LEstANIGAY
LAW Noms does not regularly feature letters, the next issue contained thirteen letters from
members of the lesbian and gay legal community, including the attorney for Thomas S. expressing various viewpoints. See supra note 116. The case is also dilscussed in Victoria
Brownworth, Family in Crisis: When Al Donors Claim Fatherhood. 4 DEEtUVE: THE LESBIAN
MAG. 44 (1994).
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and another child born to her nonlegal mother the previous year. After

several years, both children met their sperm donors, considering them
as family friends but knowledgeable as to the men's status as sperm
donors or biological fathers.130 After a disagreement, Thomas S., a
gay male attorney, 3 ' brought an action arguing that as the child's
"proven biological father," he was "absolutely entitled to an order of
filiation, and also entitled to an order of visitation."'t3 2 In resisting the
request for filiation and visitation, the lesbian mother(s)' arguments
included that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should preclude Thomas
S. from asserting his parental rights at this late date. The court accepted
this argument, applying it as a common law principle relevant to adju-

dicating paternity "for families whose reality is more complex than a
one mother, one father biological model.""' In so doing, the court
stressed the factual details of the case. Thus, although the trial court's
opinion in Thomas S. supports lesbian parenting, it is problematic because it leaves unresolved the quality and quantity of facts necessary to

establish legal fatherhood. As demonstrated by the particular factual
details in the opinion as well as the particular factual details proffered
by those who disagree with the opinion,"

this cannot be a satisfacto-

ry solution to the problems inherent in lesbians' relations with children.' 35
130. 599 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79.
131. The court noted that both Thomas S. and Sandm R., the nonlegal mother. are attorneys.
Id. at 378.
132. Id. at 380.
133. Id. at 382.
134. LESBiAN/GAY LAW Noms, edited by Arthur S. Leonard, Professor of Law at New York
Law School, related the facts as including that "a relationship was established" with visits, calls,
cards, and letters between the parties and also surmised that as the child "grew older and her
relationship with Steel [Thomas S.] became more extensive, her mothers apparently became
concerned about encroachment on their New York-based family unit and sought to limit contact." Judge Denies Parental Standing to Gay Sperm Donor, LESBiAN/GAY L. Noms (Lesbian
& Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), May 1993, at 33. Letters in response
ranged in content from direct factual disputes: "It was the plaintiff's [Thomas S.] homophoble
and insulting demand to introduce his biological daughter to his family in the absence of her
mothers, whom he was 'not comfortable' including, that brought about this litigation," see supra
note 116. at 2 (letter of Lesley Yulkowski); to criticism that Professor Leonard departed from
the trial judge's findings. Other letter writers related their personal knowledge concerning Thomas S.'s "fatherly relationship." See, e.g., letter of Ann Philbin. Among these writers was Thomas
S.'s trial attorney who included quotes from letters and cards, and conclusions relating to the
mothers' intentions. Letter from Emily Olshansky.
135. As Professor Arthur Leonard stated in his reply to the letters criticizing his digest of the
opinion in LESBIANIGAY LAW NoTEs:
I recently wrote a book for which I immersed myself in scores of court opinions on
lesbian and gay issues. On the basis of that experience. I hesitate to accept the official findings of "fact" in court opinions as conclusive of reality . . . . [W]e should
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Importantly, however, any contrary decision" 6 would be a tortured
valorization of the interlocking and inconsistent analytics of biology and
heterosexuality, as well as the preservation of male hegemony. It is
clear that a biological valorization would occur if the court accepted the
sperm donor's argument that he is absolutely entitled to an order of
filiation based upon his biological connection. Less clear are the intricacies of heterosexism and sexism should the sperm donor prevail, which
are perhaps obscured by the identity of the sperm donor as a gay man.
In a situation in which a child is parented by a dyad, as in the
situation in Thomas S., but for the fact that the dyad is a lesbian one
rather than a married heterosexual one, Thomas S. would have no viable claim. The declaration of the sperm donor as a father-even if the
sperm donor is not himself heterosexual-reestablishes heterosexuality
as normative, natural, and inevitable through the "real" heterosexually
coupled parents. Further, the disparity between the treatment accorded
the male member needed to complete the heterosexual dyad and the
"third party" nonlegal lesbian mother who is irrelevant to the heterosexual dyad is instructive. Seemingly, the sperm donor can establish himself as a legal father with sufficient "facts," but no amount of good
facts on the side of the nonlegal mother can establish her as a par37

ent.1

Even apart from sexual orientation constructions, the factual basis
for declaring parenthood is gendered. It is difficult to imagine a judicial
recognition of several visits, even many visits, over a period of ten
years as an indication of motherhood. That custody determinations
occur and reflect disparate power between the genders is wellknown; 38 less explored is how this gendered dynamic operates among
lesbians and gay men. 39 It is particularly troubling that Thomas S.

view court "findings" in gay cases with some skepticism.
Id. at 4. My own experience in researching lesbian and gay judicial decisions mirrors Leonard's.
and thus, I agree wholeheartedly. However. I would not limit my skepticism of "facts" as -con-

elusive of reality" to the legal realm or confine it to discernible biases such as homophobia
which often operate in judicial opinions, given the tremendous power and popularization of recent theory disputing such a correlation. Thus. I depart from any proffered model of
"intentionality" based upon "conduct" rooted in factual conclusions to determine parenthood. Cf
Hill. supra note 63.
136. Victoria Brownworth reports on a decision in a similar case in California in which the
trial court granted the sperm donor joint custody. Brownworth. supra note 129. at 45.
137. See supra Part HI(A).
138. See, e.g.. PHYLLIs CHtsETER, MonTmRS ON TRtAL 65-92 (1986) (estimating that 70,o of

women lose custody if seriously challenged by men).
139. For a discussion of some of the similarities and differences between lesbians and gay
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argued that a failure to accord him legal fatherhood status would

"brand" the child "illegitimate."' 140 This argument seeks to capitalize
antiquated notions of morality that are sexist, as well
upon and enforce
4
1
as heterosexist.
In arguing that their status as sperm donors entitled them to the
privilege of parenthood, Thomas S., Jhordan K., and C.M. relied upon
dyadic notions of parenthood, which would exclude any nonlegal mother from the dyad while installing themselves within the requisite heterosexually composed dyadic formation that is parenthood. If the sperm
donor is not successful, he is relegated to status as a third party, a
person outside of the parenting dyad, without recourse unless he can
overcome the presumptions accorded to legal parents.
C.

Grandparents

Grandparents are classic third parties. 4 However, in many lesbian
custody cases, these third parties have been granted custody over the
objections of the lesbian legal mother. The third party doctrine, which
in this case should protect lesbian legal mothers, is not applied to their
advantage. Instead, the preference accorded to legal parents is overcome
by reference to lesbianism, either explicitly or covertly.

The situation of Sharon Bottoms, which received extensive media
coverage, 43 exemplifies this predicament. Last year, a Virginia trial
court granted a maternal grandmother's petition for custody of her

men in custody decisions pursuant to marital relations, see Jenni Millbank, Lesbian Mothers,
Gay Fathers: Sameness and Difference, 2 AUSTRALIAN GAY & LESBIAN L.J. 21 (1992).
140. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 381 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1993). This contention is legally incorrect under
New York law. While adjudication of paternity may have some effects under other statutory
schemes such as intestate succession, only Thomas S.'s marriage to the biological mother. Robin
Y.. would render the child "legitimate" under the definition of legitimacy contained in New
York Domestic Relations Law. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1988).
141. As Susan Boyd observed, this argument is an invocation of the entire patriarchal history
of relationships with children. Boyd, supra note 60, at 130. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has
implicitly rejected such notions by according state statutory classifications based upon legitimacy
more than rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lalli
v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
142. For a discussion of grandparents, see Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents, and
Grandchildren: Making a Case for Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. __ (1994).
143. See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres. Jr., Judge's Decision in Custody Case Raises Concerns.
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at A16: Ginia Bellafante et al., News Digest, TIME, Sept. 20, 1993,
at 17: Bill Hewitt, Fighting for Tyler, PEOPLE, Sept. 27, 1993. at 71: Elizabeth Kastor. The Battlie for the Boy in the Middle: Little Tyler's Mom is a Lesbian, So Grandma Got to Take Him
Away, WASH. POST, Oct. 1. 1993, at Cl.

1994]
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grandchild based upon the
daughter-was a Iesbian. 44

fact

that

the

child's

mother-her

Delivering his oral judgment, the trial judge stated:
The dispute . . . presents the question of whether the child's
best interest is served by a transfer of the custody of the child

from her mother to her maternal grandmother, Kay Bottoms.
That's the ultimate issue on the bottom line that we come to.

The mother, Sharon Bottoms, has openly admitted in this
court that she is living in an active homosexual relationship.
She admitted she is sharing a bedroom and her bed with another, her female lover, whom she identified by name as April

Wade. Sharon Bottoms in this courtroom admitted a commitment to April Wade, which as she contemplates will be permanent, and as I understand her testimony, long lasting if not
forever.
She readily admits her behavior in open affection shown to

April Wade in front of the child. Examples given were kissing,
patting, all of this in the presence of the child. She further
admits consenting that the child referred
to April Wade, her
45
lover, as to quote the words "Da Da."'

144. In re Doustou, No. CH93JA0517-00 (Cir. CL of Cty. of Henrico. Va. Sept. 7. 1993) (on
file with author). The attorney representing the grandmother. Pamela Kay Bottoms. called as his
first witness Sharon Bottoms. After establishing her identity as the child's legal mother and the
identity of his client as the child's grandmother, the attorney immediately focused his questions
on lesbianism:
Q: Now, in the juvenile court you stated that you are in a lesbian relationship with
whom?
A: April Wade.
Q: Now, for the record, would you tell me your definition of a lesbian relationship.
What does it mean?
A: It means two people of the same sex are together.
Q: In what way are they together?
A: In a relationship.
Q: Now, you say a "relationship," does that entail sex?
A: Yes.
Q: Hugging and kissing?
A: Yes.
Q: Sleeping in the same bed?
A: Yes.
Q: Now then, you're not at all ashamed of that relationship, is that correct?
A: No, sir.
Transcript of Hearing at 9-10. In re Doustou. No. CH93JA0517-00 (Cir. C. of Cty. of Henrico,
Va. Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bottoms Transcript].
145. Id at 195-96.
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The trial judge then stated that the "mother's conduct is illegal" rendering her "an unfit parent."'146 While cognizant of the "presumption in
the law [being] in favor of. . .. the natural parent," the court found that
Sharon Bottoms' "circumstances of unfitness" were of "such an extraordinary nature" sufficient to rebut the presumption of parental custody. 47 The court then denied overnight visitation to the legal mother
as well as any visitation in the presence of April Wade.'4 8
On appeal, Sharon Bottoms contends that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the parental presumption and award custody to the
third party grandmother. She also argues that the court did not apply
the required best interests of the child standard after it had decided the
legal parent and nonparent should receive equal consideration. 49 The
trial judge relied upon a Virginia Supreme Court opinion which applied
a per se rule disqualifying a lesbian mother in a custody contest with
the child's father.'
In so doing, the judge gave little effect to the
state court's articulation of the third party custody standard. This standard, as applied in a case cited by the trial court, would deny a grandmother custody of her grandchild in a situation in which the child's
custodial parent continued to live with a killer, even the killer of the
child's other parent.' 5' As expressed by the appellate court, such circumstances, although a matter of concern, do not constitute an "extraor52
dinary reason" to deprive the legal parent of custody.'
The amount of press coverage devoted to the Bottoms' situation
might lead one to believe it is an aberration. However, the courts of
53
Mississippi confronted a similar situation. In White v. Thompson,
the paternal grandparents sought custody of their grandchildren on the
grounds that their mother was an unfit parent. The bulk of the testimony concerned the mother's lesbian relationship, which prompted the trial

146. Id. at 196.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 197.
149. See Appellant's Opening Brief, In re Doustou, No. 1930-93-2 (on file with author); see
also Brief of Amicus Curiae National Center for Lesbian Rights. et al., In re Doustou, No.
1930-93-2 (on file with author).
150. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). For a discussion of the different standards relating to lesbianism as applied in custody cases between parents, see ROBSON. (OUt)LAW, supra

note 2, at 130-34.
151. Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). cited in Bottoms Transcript. supra
note 144, at 196. The trial judge in Doustou refers to the "extraordinary" nature required by
"the Mason case," but does not discuss the facts of the case.
152. Mason, 385 S.E.2d at 246.
153. 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990).
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court to find the mother "unfit, morally and otherwise, to have custody
of her children."'" On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the
mother argued that the trial court's finding was impermissibly predicated solely on her lesbianism. The Mississippi Supreme Court finessed
the issue of her sexuality, deciding not to reach the issue of whether
lesbianism alone was sufficient to render a parent unfit and allow the
court to award custody, to third parties:
Though the predominant issue in this case seems to have
been Mrs. White's lesbian relationship, and the chancellor may
have relied almost entirely on this, we find that a review of the
entire record and the circumstances present.., shows that the
chancellor's decision that Mrs. White was an unfit mother,
morally and otherwise, was not against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.'
The circumstances included some testimony that the children had not
been properly supervised, clothed or fed2 55 The level of such impropriety remains vague, and thus vaguely troubling. Further, considerations of class are again relevant: the label of unfit applied by the
judiciary is as class-coded as was the label of third sex applied by the
sexologists."s As the dissenting justice in White explained at the outset of his opinion, any neglect of the children was "no more than one
would expect to find in any case where a twenty four year old mother
with but a high school diploma and no independent means" was attempting to support her children.15 1 Yet such neglect was sufficient to
satisfy the state standard5 9for rebutting the presumption of custody accorded to a legal parent.1
154.
155.
156.
157.

It at 1183.
Id.at 1184.
Id.
See supra Part I.

158. 569 So. 2d at 1185 (Robertson, J.,dissenting). As the court's opinion states, the legal
mother last worked in a convenience store, she lived with her children and her lover in a trailer, she testified that "she sometimes slept until 11 a."

and there was conflicting testimony

about "the children being outdoors during cold weather with inadequate clothing." 569 So. 2d at
1182-83. The legal mother also testified that conditions at the trailer "were a lot better" now
than when her husband, the grandparent's son, had lived there. I&dat 1183.
159. Both the majority and dissenting justices agreed that the standard in Mississippi is a presumption in favor of the legal parent which third parties can overcome only upon a clear show-

ing that the parent has abandoned the child; or that the conduct of the parent is so immoral as
to be a detriment to the child; or that the parent is unfit mentally or otherwise to have custody
of the child. 569 So. 2d at 1183-86 (citing Milarn v. Mlilam, 509 So. 2d 864. 866 (Miss.
1987)); Luttrell v. Kneisley, 427 So. 2d 1384. 1387 (Miss. 1983); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So.
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The message of White is that a court can deflect the contentious
issue of lesbianism with reference to more vague and class-coded standards. Such an approach could be applied in Doustou,'60 in which the
appellate court could credit the grandmother's testimony that the two
year old child once cursed and stood in the corner. 61 Thus, even if
the Virginia appellate court departed from a per se disqualification of

lesbian mothers as parents, it could nevertheless affirm the trial judge's
ruling.
Importantly, in both Doustou and White, the heterosexual dyadic

model of parenting did not operate to the legal mother's benefit. In
Doustou, the child's legal father had never expressed an interest in the
child, 62 and the attempt at any reconstruction of a dyadic parent
model with April Wade was deemed criminal. 6 3 Likewise, in White,
t64
the children's legal father was not a contender for legal custody,
and again any attempt to reconstruct a dyadic parenting model with a woman was deemed unacceptable. In Doustou, the grandmother did not have

a heterosexual mate at the time of the hearing;

65

while in White, the

2d 671. 673 (Miss. 1973)).
160. Such an approach would certainly be consistent with the testimony of Pamela Kay Bottoms, When asked by her attorney to tell the court why she believed she should have custody
of the child rather than her daughter, she stated, "Tyler is a bundle of joy. You have to know
him. He shouldn't be raised by two lesbians. He is being taught to call Sharon's lover "Da
Da." I can do more for Tyler financially, He is going to be mentally - -" Bottoms Transcript.
supra note 144, at 53.
161. Testimony of Pamela Kay Bottoms, Bottoms Transcript, supra note 144, at 57. The trial
judge's oral ruling contains a reference to this "cursing" and "standing in the comer" as "other
evidence" of the child being affected. Id. at 197.
162. Testimony of Sharon Bottoms, Bottoms Transcript, supra note 144. at 17.
163. The trial judge stated, "the mother's conduct is illegal. It is a class 6 felony in the
Commonwealth of Virginia." Bottoms Transcript, supra note 144, at 196.
164. The paternal grandparents agreed that the children's father "should not have custody due
to his financial situation and his drinking problem." White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181,
1183 (Miss. 1990). As the dissenting judge declared:
It is important that An's estranged husband makes no claim to custody. His closet is
filled with as many skeletons as hers, if not more. David White is a career drunk
who, after An threw him out, took up with a live-in girlfriend of his own. His financial neglect of his children has been massive. Indeed, most of An's neglect is attributable to the employment she has been forced to pursue because of David's irresponsibility.
Id. at 1186 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
165. In this instance, this may have been beneficial. Sharon Bottoms testified that she had
been sexually abused by her mother's male partner from the time she was about twelve years
old until she left home at 17 or 18. She further testified that this man lived with her for 16
years, leaving only "about two weeks" before the first custody hearing regarding Sharon
Bottoms' child. Testimony of Sharon Bottoms. Bottoms Transcript, supra note 144. at 20-25.
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paternal grandparents present themselves in the heterosexual model.
Thus, while the dyadic model of parenting should have operated in

favor of the lesbian legal mothers-relegating others to less favored
third party status-because the legal parents could not satisfy the im-

plicit heterosexual requirement of the dyad, these members of the "third
sex" become equated with "third parties."

Certainly, preferences for legal parents over grandparents or other
third parties can operate in favor of a lesbian legal mother.'" Never-

theless, such preferences are certainly no guarantee-or even adequate
insulation-against lesbian legal parents being deprived of relations with
their children. Further, third parties can gain an advantage by invoking

the most powerful third party of all-the state-to regulate the relationships of lesbian mothers. 67
IV. CONCLUSION

An examination of the application of third party doctrine in the
context of lesbian relations with children reveals that the doctrine can

operate to both the benefit and detriment of lesbians. Rather than attempt to refine the doctrine so that it might better accommodate lesbians, I suggest that the doctrine's theoretical underpinnings in a notion

Interestingly, Sharon Bottoms told her mother about the sexual abuse by the male partner, but
Pamela Kay Bottoms apparently did not initially believe her daughter. ihLat 23-24. However.
Pamela Kay Bottoms did exclude her male partner from the house on the advice of the attorney
she consulted after Sharon had refused to allow the child to visit while the male partner was
present. This was also when she petitioned for custody. Testimony of Pamela Kay Bottoms.
Bottoms Transcript, supra note 144. at 62.
166. For example, in Gerald D. & Margaret D. v. Peggy R.. 1980 WVL 20452 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Nov. 17, 1980), although the court noted that the legal mother had been living with her parents
and the grandparents participated in all aspects of the child's life,
it applied the standard in disputes between a parent and a third party (which the court articulated as "best interest determination but any third party seeking such custody bears a heavy burden of persuasion") to award
custody to the lesbian legal mother.
In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed a trial judge's denial
of the lesbian mother's petition to remove guardianship from an unrelated third party, holding
that the mother's actions did not constitute abandonment and that her lesbianism did not render
her unfit. Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
167. The state as third party, notably as a party in abuse, neglect, dependency, delinquency.
or deprivation cases, in which the state assumes custody of the child or awards custody to
another person, is beyond the scope of this Article. However. it is important to note that lesbianism does arise as an issue in such proceedings. See. e.g.. In re Breisch. 434 A.2d 815 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981); see also In re JA. & LA., 601 A.2d 69 (D.C. 1991). Further. in a recent
situation, a grandmother reportedly contacted state authorities and charged her daughter and her
daughter's lover with abusing the daughter's child, although the mother later posted bail for her
daughter. See Ingrid Ricks, A Family Affair, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 19. 1994. at 49.
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of parenting as a heterosexual dyad render it problematic for lesbians,
and objectionable from the perspective of developing a lesbian legal
theory. Just as we no longer speak of lesbians as members of a "third
sex," we should abandon the language of "third parties" in the lesbian
context. Perhaps a rejection of the underlying heterosexism and sexism
of the dyadic model of parenting will not be far behind.

